Listening to Foreigners - Elif Yavnik |
In this paper I will explore some aspects of the philosophical significance of a belated discussion of the “Foreigners in Philosophy” based on my experience as a Turkish graduate philosophy student in an American university. I will start out by describing some unevenness, some ‘gradations’, within the experience of ‘foreignness’, for example, the differences between foreigners from culturally ‘Western’ countries and from ‘non-Western’ ones. I will then describe my experiences as a foreign graduate student, and then explore the philosophical implications of this experience concerning justice and enrichment of philosophical work.
In her “Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition” Saray Ayala takes up the question of the perception of non-native philosophers in the English-speaking academy and claims “we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy”[1]. While her focus in this paper is rather on the language dimension of the interaction with foreign philosophers, I would like to discuss the broader daily experience of the foreigners, with the same aims in mind: justice, and doing better philosophy.
I will describe my experience of foreignness as not merely a geographical but a primarily existential dislocation: a unique experience that is overwhelming but also profoundly enriching. I will relate the specific cognitive and emotional weight that simply the daily existence turns out to be for a foreigner, and how that affects their intellectual capacities and in turn their self-perception, confidence and performance when this specific situation is not acknowledged and a means of rendering their experience transparent even to themselves is not available.
This experience is not merely limited to foreigners in philosophy departments – but it is us, the philosophy people, who are to examine its nature and implications. I hold that the implications are twofold: First of all, there simply needs to be a recognition of ‘foreignness’ as a special category, so that the departments are made aware of the foreign students’ situations and judge their (especially initial) performance accordingly. And then the needs for accommodation that this entails ought to be considered. These would range from including the expectation that the native speakers make an effort to speak slower in case they are fast talkers as an accommodation need in meetings, conferences, etc., to having access to ‘diversity’ funds in universities, which we currently do not have. They would actually have to start as early as the acceptance into the programs: the international philosophy graduate students in the American academy are predominantly from Western cultures; and there is reason to think that this may be due partly to the nature of the application process where the non-Western students may have cultural barriers against talking themselves up.
The claims to such demands of accommodation may be made in the name of justice, but they may be made equally in the name of philosophy. Taking as resources María Lugones’ conception of ‘world-travelling’ and Ofelia Schutte’s analysis of “cross-cultural ‘incommensurability’”, I will claim that the ‘existential dislocation’ of the experience of being foreign allows one to view the world not only from plural perspectives, but also experience those perspectives as perspectives, which is very valuable for a philosopher. Were the nature of this experience acknowledged and celebrated, and relevant concepts made available to the foreign individuals, profoundly enriching experiences would be added to the philosophical engagements of the American academy. Schutte claims that the ‘incommensurable’, that which is not culturally translatable, is possibly “the most important part of the message my Anglophone interlocutor needs to receive”; she also points out that this insistence on the part of the dominant subject to hear only what is translatable is motivated by the desire to not let “the other (as other) make any demands in his everyday world, for in this case he might have to change his way of being”[2]. The interlocutors will not cease to miss some of the most important contributions that only the foreigner philosophy people can make, unless they recognize their situation in the world they share, and be open to learning from them. Truly listening to the expression of these experiences, the dominant speaking subject would be able to experience the ‘perspective’ in their world, witness other ways of living/thinking, have their intellectual and emotional assumptions that constitute the basis of their existential orientation called into question, that is, they would have the possibility to experience “world”-traveling.
Notes:
[1] Saray Ayala, “Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition”, APA Newsletter, Volume 14, Number 2, Spring 2015, 3
[2] Ofelia Schutte, “Cultural Alterity: Cross-Cultural Communication and Feminist Theory in North-South Contexts”, Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 1998, 60
In her “Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition” Saray Ayala takes up the question of the perception of non-native philosophers in the English-speaking academy and claims “we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy”[1]. While her focus in this paper is rather on the language dimension of the interaction with foreign philosophers, I would like to discuss the broader daily experience of the foreigners, with the same aims in mind: justice, and doing better philosophy.
I will describe my experience of foreignness as not merely a geographical but a primarily existential dislocation: a unique experience that is overwhelming but also profoundly enriching. I will relate the specific cognitive and emotional weight that simply the daily existence turns out to be for a foreigner, and how that affects their intellectual capacities and in turn their self-perception, confidence and performance when this specific situation is not acknowledged and a means of rendering their experience transparent even to themselves is not available.
This experience is not merely limited to foreigners in philosophy departments – but it is us, the philosophy people, who are to examine its nature and implications. I hold that the implications are twofold: First of all, there simply needs to be a recognition of ‘foreignness’ as a special category, so that the departments are made aware of the foreign students’ situations and judge their (especially initial) performance accordingly. And then the needs for accommodation that this entails ought to be considered. These would range from including the expectation that the native speakers make an effort to speak slower in case they are fast talkers as an accommodation need in meetings, conferences, etc., to having access to ‘diversity’ funds in universities, which we currently do not have. They would actually have to start as early as the acceptance into the programs: the international philosophy graduate students in the American academy are predominantly from Western cultures; and there is reason to think that this may be due partly to the nature of the application process where the non-Western students may have cultural barriers against talking themselves up.
The claims to such demands of accommodation may be made in the name of justice, but they may be made equally in the name of philosophy. Taking as resources María Lugones’ conception of ‘world-travelling’ and Ofelia Schutte’s analysis of “cross-cultural ‘incommensurability’”, I will claim that the ‘existential dislocation’ of the experience of being foreign allows one to view the world not only from plural perspectives, but also experience those perspectives as perspectives, which is very valuable for a philosopher. Were the nature of this experience acknowledged and celebrated, and relevant concepts made available to the foreign individuals, profoundly enriching experiences would be added to the philosophical engagements of the American academy. Schutte claims that the ‘incommensurable’, that which is not culturally translatable, is possibly “the most important part of the message my Anglophone interlocutor needs to receive”; she also points out that this insistence on the part of the dominant subject to hear only what is translatable is motivated by the desire to not let “the other (as other) make any demands in his everyday world, for in this case he might have to change his way of being”[2]. The interlocutors will not cease to miss some of the most important contributions that only the foreigner philosophy people can make, unless they recognize their situation in the world they share, and be open to learning from them. Truly listening to the expression of these experiences, the dominant speaking subject would be able to experience the ‘perspective’ in their world, witness other ways of living/thinking, have their intellectual and emotional assumptions that constitute the basis of their existential orientation called into question, that is, they would have the possibility to experience “world”-traveling.
Notes:
[1] Saray Ayala, “Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition”, APA Newsletter, Volume 14, Number 2, Spring 2015, 3
[2] Ofelia Schutte, “Cultural Alterity: Cross-Cultural Communication and Feminist Theory in North-South Contexts”, Hypatia, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 1998, 60