On being placed differently in philosophy: Toward greater inclusivity in the profession
Rebecca Bamford
I take a remark on justice by Simone Weil as my point of departure:
Anything within the field of action which does not constitute an obstacle — as, for instance, men deprived of the power to refuse — is transparent for thought in the way completely clear glass is for sight. Someone who does not see a pane of glass does not know that he does not see it. Someone who, being placed differently, does see it, does not know the other does not see it (Weil 1987, 2).
In what follows, I use Weil’s notion of being “placed differently” to develop and affirm an account of the category of the ‘foreigner in philosophy.’ I argue that context and location are important to developing a non-Western-centric account of how foreigners in philosophy may be, in diverse ways, placed differently. I critically examine immigration status, credibility, and testimonial injustice as issues affecting foreigners in philosophy, comparing and contrasting how these issues arise in two specific locations: South Africa, and the United States.
First, I identify how securing and maintaining legal immigration status affects the professional, personal, and family lives of foreigners in philosophy. I analyze specific examples such as foreigners’ ineligibility for some professional opportunities depending on immigration status, time and cost of managing legal status, effects of immigration-related instability on professional development and engagement, finances, psychological health, and family life (Bamford 2015). I also consider how differences between institutions’ support for foreigners in philosophy affects professional development. I argue that challenges associated with maintaining immigration status in different locations should be more clearly acknowledged within hiring, review, and promotion processes, and discuss some ways in which professional organizations and institutions can better support foreigners in philosophy by making relevant information more easily accessible, affirming that immigration status may negatively affect professional development, and by creating professional mentoring opportunities for foreigners.
Second, I examine how perceptions of ‘pedigree’ in doctoral training and associated professional status within what is often termed the ‘Anglophone world’ of philosophy can prevent foreigners from being recognized as credible hires (Marinoff 2009; Bruya 2015a & 2015b; Ayala 2015). I show that historical and political factors structure perceptions of professional credibility through hiring preferences tied to professional scholarship and curriculum preferences, and through problematic claims concerning universalism in philosophy (Haslanger 2008; Dotson 2011b, 2012; Okeja 2012; Matolino 2015). I use work by Kristie Dotson to show how foreigners may experience testimonial smothering and testimonial quieting in hiring, review, and promotion procedures (2011a, 242, 244). I elaborate on Ayala’s (2015) discussion of testimonial injustice based on accent, identifying a form of testimonial injustice experienced in certain contexts by foreigners who have native language command of English. I also use recent work on whiteness in the US and in South Africa in showing how some foreigners in the profession benefit from white privilege; such individuals should, I claim, affirm a conception of white identity based on rejection of white supremacy and on development of greater relational self-awareness and strive to act accordingly in their professional activities (Vice 2010; Bailey 2011; McKaiser 2011; Alcoff 2015).
Looking ahead, I suggest we work to stop defining the profession in terms of language or location, as part of promoting greater inclusivity and justice (Mbembe 2015). I contend that we should avoid vague and unreflective talk of the ‘Anglophone’ world of philosophy in order to prevent exclusion of differently placed foreigners working in diverse global contexts. As I show, it remains unclear whether talk of ‘Anglophone philosophy’ attends sufficiently to the official language policies of relevant nations in which professional philosophy is conducted, philosophy in translation (Streitfeld 2010), or philosophy developed in and through multiple languages. I appeal to Dotson’s (2012) discussion of diverse practitioners in philosophy, and her defense of values held in a professional culture of praxis, in order to support a positive account of foreigners’ different placement within professional philosophy. Dotson shows that even while challenges for diverse populations within professional philosophy differ, “the general challenges presented by the environment of professional philosophy and constrictive definitions of philosophy are similar” (2012, 5). Recognizing foreigners in philosophy as diverse practitioners in particular contexts would enable contributions to the profession from differently placed perspectives to be valued, and would promote what Dotson identifies as “creative philosophical engagement” and “livable options” in the profession (2012, 17, 20, 26).
Works Cited
Alcoff, L. 2015. The Future of Whiteness. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ayala, S. 2015. “Philosophy And The Non-Native-Speaker Condition.” APA Newsletter On Feminism And Philosophy 14(2): 2-9.
Bailey, A. 2011. “On White Shame and Vulnerability.” South African Journal of Philosophy 30(4): 472-483.
Bamford, R. 2015. “Long Journeys part 5: Rebecca Bamford.” Philosophers’ Cocoon <http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2015/11/long-journeys-part-5-rebecca-bamford.html>
Bruya, B. 2015a. "The Tacit Rejection of Multiculturalism in American Philosophy Ph.D. Programs." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 14(3): 369-389.
Bruya, B. 2015b. “Appearance and Reality in The Philosophical Gourmet Report: Why the Discrepancy Matters to the Profession of Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 657-690.
Dotson, K. 2011a. “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia 26(2): 236-257.
Dotson, K. 2011b. “Concrete Flowers: Contemplating The Profession Of Philosophy.” Hypatia 26(2): 403-409.
Dotson, K. 2012. “How Is This Paper Philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy 3(1): 3-29.
Haslanger, S. 2008. “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone).” Hypatia 23(2): 210-223.
Matolino, B. 2015. “Universalism and African Philosophy.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34(4): 433-440.
Marinoff, L. 2009. “Inside A Search.” Inside Higher Ed. <https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2009/08/31/inside-search>
Mbembe, A. 2015. "Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive." Public Lectures. Retrieved from <http://wiser.wits.ac.za/content/achille-mbembe-decolonizing-knowledge-and-question-archive-12054>
McKaiser, E. 2011. “How Whites Should Live In This Strange Place.” South African Journal of Philosophy 30(4): 452-461.
Okeja, U. 2012. "Space Contestations and the Teaching of African Philosophy in African Universities." South African Journal of Philosophy 31:4, 664-675.
Streitfeld, J. 2010. “What Is Anglophone Philosophy?” PhilPapers. <http://philpapers.org/post/2724>
Vice, S. 2010. “How Do I Live in This Strange Place?” Journal of Social Philosophy 41(3): 323–342.
Anything within the field of action which does not constitute an obstacle — as, for instance, men deprived of the power to refuse — is transparent for thought in the way completely clear glass is for sight. Someone who does not see a pane of glass does not know that he does not see it. Someone who, being placed differently, does see it, does not know the other does not see it (Weil 1987, 2).
In what follows, I use Weil’s notion of being “placed differently” to develop and affirm an account of the category of the ‘foreigner in philosophy.’ I argue that context and location are important to developing a non-Western-centric account of how foreigners in philosophy may be, in diverse ways, placed differently. I critically examine immigration status, credibility, and testimonial injustice as issues affecting foreigners in philosophy, comparing and contrasting how these issues arise in two specific locations: South Africa, and the United States.
First, I identify how securing and maintaining legal immigration status affects the professional, personal, and family lives of foreigners in philosophy. I analyze specific examples such as foreigners’ ineligibility for some professional opportunities depending on immigration status, time and cost of managing legal status, effects of immigration-related instability on professional development and engagement, finances, psychological health, and family life (Bamford 2015). I also consider how differences between institutions’ support for foreigners in philosophy affects professional development. I argue that challenges associated with maintaining immigration status in different locations should be more clearly acknowledged within hiring, review, and promotion processes, and discuss some ways in which professional organizations and institutions can better support foreigners in philosophy by making relevant information more easily accessible, affirming that immigration status may negatively affect professional development, and by creating professional mentoring opportunities for foreigners.
Second, I examine how perceptions of ‘pedigree’ in doctoral training and associated professional status within what is often termed the ‘Anglophone world’ of philosophy can prevent foreigners from being recognized as credible hires (Marinoff 2009; Bruya 2015a & 2015b; Ayala 2015). I show that historical and political factors structure perceptions of professional credibility through hiring preferences tied to professional scholarship and curriculum preferences, and through problematic claims concerning universalism in philosophy (Haslanger 2008; Dotson 2011b, 2012; Okeja 2012; Matolino 2015). I use work by Kristie Dotson to show how foreigners may experience testimonial smothering and testimonial quieting in hiring, review, and promotion procedures (2011a, 242, 244). I elaborate on Ayala’s (2015) discussion of testimonial injustice based on accent, identifying a form of testimonial injustice experienced in certain contexts by foreigners who have native language command of English. I also use recent work on whiteness in the US and in South Africa in showing how some foreigners in the profession benefit from white privilege; such individuals should, I claim, affirm a conception of white identity based on rejection of white supremacy and on development of greater relational self-awareness and strive to act accordingly in their professional activities (Vice 2010; Bailey 2011; McKaiser 2011; Alcoff 2015).
Looking ahead, I suggest we work to stop defining the profession in terms of language or location, as part of promoting greater inclusivity and justice (Mbembe 2015). I contend that we should avoid vague and unreflective talk of the ‘Anglophone’ world of philosophy in order to prevent exclusion of differently placed foreigners working in diverse global contexts. As I show, it remains unclear whether talk of ‘Anglophone philosophy’ attends sufficiently to the official language policies of relevant nations in which professional philosophy is conducted, philosophy in translation (Streitfeld 2010), or philosophy developed in and through multiple languages. I appeal to Dotson’s (2012) discussion of diverse practitioners in philosophy, and her defense of values held in a professional culture of praxis, in order to support a positive account of foreigners’ different placement within professional philosophy. Dotson shows that even while challenges for diverse populations within professional philosophy differ, “the general challenges presented by the environment of professional philosophy and constrictive definitions of philosophy are similar” (2012, 5). Recognizing foreigners in philosophy as diverse practitioners in particular contexts would enable contributions to the profession from differently placed perspectives to be valued, and would promote what Dotson identifies as “creative philosophical engagement” and “livable options” in the profession (2012, 17, 20, 26).
Works Cited
Alcoff, L. 2015. The Future of Whiteness. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ayala, S. 2015. “Philosophy And The Non-Native-Speaker Condition.” APA Newsletter On Feminism And Philosophy 14(2): 2-9.
Bailey, A. 2011. “On White Shame and Vulnerability.” South African Journal of Philosophy 30(4): 472-483.
Bamford, R. 2015. “Long Journeys part 5: Rebecca Bamford.” Philosophers’ Cocoon <http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2015/11/long-journeys-part-5-rebecca-bamford.html>
Bruya, B. 2015a. "The Tacit Rejection of Multiculturalism in American Philosophy Ph.D. Programs." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 14(3): 369-389.
Bruya, B. 2015b. “Appearance and Reality in The Philosophical Gourmet Report: Why the Discrepancy Matters to the Profession of Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 657-690.
Dotson, K. 2011a. “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia 26(2): 236-257.
Dotson, K. 2011b. “Concrete Flowers: Contemplating The Profession Of Philosophy.” Hypatia 26(2): 403-409.
Dotson, K. 2012. “How Is This Paper Philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy 3(1): 3-29.
Haslanger, S. 2008. “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone).” Hypatia 23(2): 210-223.
Matolino, B. 2015. “Universalism and African Philosophy.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34(4): 433-440.
Marinoff, L. 2009. “Inside A Search.” Inside Higher Ed. <https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2009/08/31/inside-search>
Mbembe, A. 2015. "Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive." Public Lectures. Retrieved from <http://wiser.wits.ac.za/content/achille-mbembe-decolonizing-knowledge-and-question-archive-12054>
McKaiser, E. 2011. “How Whites Should Live In This Strange Place.” South African Journal of Philosophy 30(4): 452-461.
Okeja, U. 2012. "Space Contestations and the Teaching of African Philosophy in African Universities." South African Journal of Philosophy 31:4, 664-675.
Streitfeld, J. 2010. “What Is Anglophone Philosophy?” PhilPapers. <http://philpapers.org/post/2724>
Vice, S. 2010. “How Do I Live in This Strange Place?” Journal of Social Philosophy 41(3): 323–342.